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Recent climate events such as Hurricane Harvey in Texas foreshadow the 
dangers that could result from critical energy infrastructure failure in Canada due 
to physical impacts caused by climate change. This article examines the types 
of climate impacts that could affect critical energy infrastructure in Canada. The 
article argues that these impacts translate into three types of corporate risk to the 
owners and operators of the critical asset: economic risks to the infrastructure 
asset; management and operational risks to the corporation; and risks arising 
from corporate disclosure obligations. Applying the theoretical approach of “risk 
management,” the article concludes that, on this approach, any effects of climate 
impacts on the critical infrastructure asset will be limited to a narrow corporate risk. 
By contrast, the paper argues that by applying an expanded understanding of the 
critical energy infrastructure asset’s context, one where the critical infrastructure 
asset is viewed as existing within its broader economic, social, and environmental 
geography, a climate impact on the infrastructure asset is thus also a climate 
impact on the infrastructure’s environment. On this broader understanding, 
the risk of a climate impact may not fall solely upon the corporation, and the 
public and governments may seek to expand their in? uence over what adaptive 
measures are required to ensure resilience of the asset. It can be anticipated that 
increased public interest in the adaptation of critical energy infrastructure will 
result in uncertainty and potential resistance by corporations. A new corporate 
risk is likely to emerge. 
Des événements climatiques récents comme l’ouragan Harvey, au Texas, laissent 
présager les dangers qui pourraient résulter d’une défaillance des infrastructures 
énergétiques essentielles au Canada en raison des impacts physiques causés 
par les changements climatiques. Le présent article examine les types d’impacts 
climatiques qui pourraient affecter les infrastructures énergétiques essentielles 
au Canada. L’article fait valoir que ces répercussions se traduisent par trois types 
de risques pour les propriétaires et les exploitants des infrastructures essentielles 
: les risques économiques liés aux infrastructures, les risques opérationnels et de 
gestion pour les sociétés et les risques découlant des obligations d’information 
qu’ont les sociétés. En appliquant l’approche théorique de la « gestion des 
risques », l’article conclut que, selon cette approche, les effets des impacts 
climatiques sur les infrastructures essentielles seront limités à un risque limité pour 
les sociétés. En revanche, l’article soutient qu’en appliquant une compréhension 
élargie du contexte des infrastructures énergétiques essentielles, c’est-à-dire un 
contexte dans lequel ces infrastructures sont considérées comme faisant partie 
d’un ensemble économique, social et environnemental plus large, les impacts 
climatiques sur les infrastructures sont donc également des impacts climatiques 
sur l’environnement des infrastructures. Dans cette optique plus large, le risque 
d’un impact climatique peut ne pas incomber uniquement à la société, et le public 
et les gouvernements peuvent chercher à étendre leur in? uence sur les mesures 
d’adaptation nécessaires pour assurer la résilience de l’actif. On peut s’attendre à 
ce que l’intérêt accru du public pour l’adaptation des infrastructures énergétiques 
essentielles entraîne de l’incertitude et une résistance potentielle de la part des 
entreprises. Un nouveau risque d’entreprise est susceptible d’apparaître.
* Assistant Professor, University of Calgary, Faculty of Law. The author would like to acknowledge 
the generous research funding of the Foundation for Legal Research and the Stikeman Elliot LLP 
Fellowship in Corporate Law. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2018 Dalhousie 
University Schulich School of Law Purdy Crawford Business Law Workshop. The author would like 
to thank the participants of the workshop for their helpful comments.
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II. The concept of “critical infrastructure”
III. Translating climate impacts into corporate risk
1. Economic risks
2. Corporate management and operational risks
3. Risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations
IV. Climate impacts as direct and indirect risks to the Corporation
1. Climate impacts as a direct corporate risk
2. Integrated risk management and direct corporate risk
3. Climate impacts as an indirect corporate and social risk
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Conclusion
Introduction
Consider the role of infrastructure in the following climate event: when 
Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas on 25 August 2017, little attention 
was paid to the “500 chemical plants, 10 re? neries and more than 6,670 
miles of intertwined oil, gas and chemical pipelines [that] line the nation’s 
largest energy corridor.”1 Harris County, home to Houston, also “hosts 
more than two dozen current and former toxic waste sites designated under 
the federal Superfund program. At least 14 of these sites—whose grounds 
are contaminated with dioxins, lead, arsenic, benzene or other compounds 
from industrial activities—were ? ooded or damaged by Hurricane 
1. Associated Press, “Hurricane Harvey’s Toxic Impact Deeper Than Public Told,” Associated 
Press (23 March 2018), online: <www.apnews.com/e0ceae76d5894734b0041210a902218d> [perma.
cc/S5AJ-NQXX]; See also United States Environmental Protection Agency, News Release, “PA/
TCEQ Harvey Update: Air Quality Improving, More Water Systems Operational” (6 September 
2017), online: <https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epatceq-harvey-update-air-quality-improving-
more-water-systems-operational> [perma.cc/N4L6-TTJK].
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Harvey.”2 This catastrophic incident foreshadows the signi? cant dangers 
that could result from infrastructure failure due to physical impacts caused 
by climate change, which this article terms “climate impacts.”
Canada’s 2009 National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure considers 
infrastructure as critical where the asset is essential to the “health, safety, 
security or economic well-being of Canadians.”3 Examples of such 
assets, which this paper terms “critical energy infrastructure,” include 
electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, oil and gas industry 
infrastructure, maritime ports related to the energy sector, and railway 
infrastructure. All of these classes of assets are vulnerable to the anticipated 
and unanticipated effects of climate change. 
This article examines climate impacts to critical energy infrastructure 
assets in Canada from a corporate risk perspective. It breaks ground 
by examining climate impacts on any one of these assets as an outright 
corporate risk, which has the potential to manifest itself as follows. Climate 
change events may not only cause ?????? impacts to a critical infrastructure 
asset, resulting in a direct corporate risk, but also ???????? impacts, where 
the economic, social, and environmental systems dependent on the critical 
asset are affected by a climate event on the asset. The article explores the 
implications of these direct and indirect impacts from the perspective of 
the owners and operators of the critical assets and translates these climate 
impacts into three corporate risks: economic risks; management and 
operational risks; and risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations.
Economic risks are perhaps the most overt risks to the owners and 
operators of the critical infrastructure asset. Here, a climate impact has 
the potential to cause damage to the asset and reduce its operability and 
resultant pro? ts to the corporation. In addition, a climate impact may 
require the asset to be rebuilt and may expose the corporation to liabilities 
for environmental spills and potential contamination. Management and 
operational risks from climate impacts pose challenges to the directors 
2. Hiroko Tabuchi & Sheila Kaplan, “A Sea of Health and Environmental Hazards in Houston’s 
Floodwaters,” ????????????? ?????? (31 August 2017),?online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/us/
houston-contaminated-? oodwaters.html> [perma.cc/7H7H-K4XY].  
3. Canada, Public Safety Canada, ????????? ????????? ???? ????????? ???????????????? ????, online: 
<www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx> [perma.cc/BT7X-
JCSH ] [?????????????????????????????????????????????]; for a current de? nition of “climate adaptation” 
see also Danny Bednar, Jonathan Raikes & Gordon McBean, “The Governance of Climate Change 
Adaptation in Canada” (February 2018) ICLR Research Paper Series—number 60, online (pdf): 
?????????? ???? ????????????? ????? ?????????? <www.iclr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/cca-climate-
change-report-2018.pdf > [perma.cc/8K76-ANEE] which considers climate adaptation as “a complex 
process of preparing for actual or projected changes in climate averages and extremes. This process 
generally takes place in ? ve stages. These stages overlap with the responsibilities and interests of a 
multitude of actors, making the adaptation process complex” (?????at 7).
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and of? cers of the corporation, whereby a corporate risk may arise from 
regulatory obligations to operate safe and reliable assets in the energy 
infrastructure sector. Risks arising from corporate governance and 
disclosure obligations may expose directors and of? cers of the corporation 
to strict penalties for inadequate or defective corporate disclosure. 
Overall, these three corporate risks could expose directors and of? cers 
to corporate liability and may signi? cantly affect the pro? tability of the 
corporation. This, in turn, will likely negatively affect the value of the 
critical asset and the overall corporation. Further, the article argues that 
when the indirect effects of a climate impact are factored into a corporate 
risk analysis, a climate event has the potential to increase the overall 
exposure of the owner or operator of the critical infrastructure asset to 
what this paper calls a “new corporate risk.” This new risk could arise 
due to greater public and governmental scrutiny in the management and 
regulation of the critical infrastructure asset. 
To address this corporate risk, the article focuses on the importance 
of undertaking climate adaptation, “a process of adjustment in natural and 
human systems to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects,”4 to 
critical energy infrastructure in Canada. Despite its importance, adaptation 
has not received the necessary attention in the global climate change 
debate,5 which has predominantly focused on mitigation efforts,6 disaster 
response to climate event risks,7 and climate change and insurance law.8
Encouragingly, climate adaptation as a corporate risk is gaining attention 
in the literature,9 although the discussion remains somewhat limited, 
4. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers, (Toronto: Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2014), online (pdf): <www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ar5_wgII_
spm_en-1.pdf> [perma.cc/N732-GBXF] at 5.
5. Edna Sussman et al, “Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Progress through Law and 
Regulation,” 18:1 NYU Envtl LJ, 55 at 57.
6. International Bar Association, IBA Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force,
Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption (London: International Bar 
Association, 2014), online: <www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.
aspx> [perma.cc/B9RZ-LCSX] at 87.
7. Kevin Quigley, Ben Bisset & Bryan Mills, Too Critical to Fail: How Canada Manages Threats 
to Critical Infrastructure (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017). See also Jocelyn 
Stacey, “Vulnerability, Disaster Law and ‘the Beast’” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 853.
8. Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “Encouraging Adaptation to Climate Change: 
Long-Term Flood Insurance” (2009) Resources for the Future Issue Brief 09-13, online (pdf): <media.
rff.org/documents/RFF-IB-09-13.pdf> [perma.cc/2V93-KFED] at 2.
9. Lee Godden et al, “Law, Governance and Risk: Deconstructing the Public-Private Divide in 
Climate Change Adaptation” (2013) 36:1 UNSWLJ 224 (“In key private law areas, there have already 
been moves to include climate change risk considerations within the scope of critical decision-making 
domains such as directors’ duties.” at 236).
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focusing primarily on corporate disclosure requirements10 and corporate 
law disputes grounded in climate adaptation.11 
The overall objective of this article is to contribute to the active 
resilience and climate adaptation debate12 by developing the argument 
that direct and indirect climate impacts on critical infrastructure translate 
into corporate risk to the owners and operators of the asset. The article 
examines the in? uence of corporate governance considerations in 
establishing a framework for managing the physical impacts of climate 
change on critical infrastructure in the energy industry and proceeds on the 
understanding that “resilience to the physical impacts of climate change…
is vital for the long-term sustainable growth of a business.”13 
The article is structured as follows. Part I explores the types of climate 
impacts that are anticipated in relation to critical energy infrastructure 
in Canada. Part II examines the concept of “critical infrastructure” and 
de? nes it for purposes of this article. Part III translates potential climate 
impacts to critical energy infrastructure into three types of corporate risk: 
economic risks to the infrastructure asset; management and operational 
risks to the corporation; and risks arising from corporate disclosure 
obligations. 
In Part IV, the article argues for a broad understanding of climate 
impacts on critical energy infrastructure. First, it considers the theoretical 
approach of “risk management,” which tends to view the critical energy 
infrastructure asset as a narrow corporate interest, and concludes that on 
this approach, any effects of climate impacts on the asset are limited to a 
10. Nina Hart, “Legal Tools for Climate Adaptation Advocacy: Securities Law” (2015) Sabin Center 
for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School White Papers, online: <academiccommons.columbia.
edu/doi/10.7916/D83R0S2Z> [perma.cc/737D-DF8Y].
11. JB Ruhl, “A Summary of Present and Future Climate Adaptation Law” (2013) Vanderbilt Public 
Law Research Paper No 13-4, online: Social Sciences Research Network <ssrn.com/abstract=2214001> 
[perma.cc/S5H9-VGSP] at 3.
12. Brian Chaf? n, Hannah Gosnell & Barbara Cosens, “A Decade of Adaptive Governance 
Scholarship: Synthesis and Future Directions” (2014) 19:3 Ecology and Society article 56; Thomas 
Dietz et al, “The Struggle to Govern the Commons” (2003) 302:3652 Science 1907; Robin Kundis 
Craig, “Trickster Law: Promoting Resilience and Adaptive Governance by Allowing Other 
Perspectives on Natural Resources Management” (27 January 2019), Ariz J Envtl L & Pol’y, 
[forthcoming], online: Social Sciences Research Network <ssrn.com/abstract=3323945> [perma.cc/
BQ88-6QE6]; for a timely discussion of risk and resilience in the Canadian context, see also Quigley, 
supra note 7.
13. Australian Government, Department of Environment and Energy, National Climate Resilience 
and Adaptation Strategy, (2015) at 7, online: <www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/adaptation/
publications/national-climate-resilience-and-adaptation-strategy> [perma.cc/9T5M-F2V3]. To this 
end, this article does not directly address critical energy infrastructure in the context of climate 
mitigation, or the risk of failed adaptation, so-called maladaptation. On maladaptation, see Jon Barnett 
& Saffron O’Neill, “Minimising the Risk of Maladaptation: A Framework for Analysis” in Jean 
Palutikof et al, eds, Climate Adaptation Futures (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
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narrow corporate risk. The paper then argues for an expanded understanding 
of the critical energy infrastructure asset’s context, one where the asset is 
viewed as existing within a broader economic, social, and environmental 
geography. On this understanding, a climate impact on critical energy 
infrastructure is also a climate impact on the infrastructure’s environment, 
thereby broadening and increasing corporate risk. 
Part V of the article explores adaptation and resilience of the corporate 
asset in this expanded context and discusses what those terms mean when 
viewed through the lense of the theory of “risk management” and when a 
broader geographical context is applied to the asset. Part VI develops the 
argument that once the critical infrastructure asset is viewed in a broader 
geographical context, the discussion of climate impacts has the potential to 
take on a mixed private and public focus, due to the social and ecological 
interconnections between the asset and its environment. This broader 
interpretation will in? uence decisions on how an infrastructure asset is 
determined to be “critical,” as well as decisions on how future adaptation 
responsibilities are to be allocated between private and public interests. 
It can be anticipated that the increased public interest in the adaptation 
of critical energy infrastructure will result in uncertainty and potential 
resistance by corporations. A new corporate risk, resulting from direct and 
indirect climate impacts to critical energy infrastructure, is therefore likely 
to emerge. The article concludes with a call for leadership by the federal 
government on climate adaptation to assist corporations in navigating this 
new risk. 
I. Anticipated climate impacts on Canadian energy infrastructure
Extreme weather and climate events will impact each region of Canada 
differently. Climate change will also impact corporate operations in the 
energy sector in different ways, speci? cally the value of corporate assets 
and their productivity. The literature distinguishes between “? rst-order 
impacts,” namely acute climate hazards that directly affect corporate 
operations, including physical impacts, and “second-order impacts,” 
which have broader economic, human and natural impacts within which 
the corporation operates.14 
Climate impacts will result in increases in temperatures and 
correspondingly, in increased rates of evaporation of water sources. 
Changes to the availability of water as a result of climate impacts are critical 
14. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Global Centre of Excellence on 
Climate Adaptation, “Advancing TCFD Guidance on Physical Climate Risks and Opportunities” 
(2018), online (pdf): <427mt.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/EBRD-GCECA_? nal_report.pdf> 
[perma.cc/4TSJ-D9MZ] [TCFD Guidance]. 
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to the energy infrastructure sector, where the generation of electricity 
is dependent on the availability of cooling water15 or water supplies are 
instrumental to industrial processes such as re? ning operations. In the 
event of anticipated droughts, power plants may therefore have to secure 
alternative water supplies or undertake expensive conversion from wet 
cooling16 to dry cooling.17 The opposite problem may also cause impacts 
on critical energy infrastructure. As electricity generation infrastructure is 
usually located near water, there is an increased risk of ? ooding. Excess 
water from ? ooding can also affect the operations of other critical energy 
infrastructure.18 For example, substations, which reduce high-voltage 
transmission electricity into lower-voltage power for distribution, are 
vulnerable to structural and operational damage caused by ? ooding.19
Flooding can also disrupt critical transmission lines by ? ooding tunnels 
and destroying line support structures as well as natural gas and petroleum 
supply systems. Hydroelectric power plants may be damaged or rendered 
inoperable by the availability of too little or too much water, with dam 
infrastructure damaged as a result of excess pressure on concrete dams. 
Outdated ? ood-risk projects may also no longer be accurate due to a 
changing climate. Given the location in Canada of energy infrastructure 
in coastal regions, such as the anticipated mega-projects on the Paci? c 
coastline to support Canada’s LNG industry, climate change may pose 
serious challenges to the safe and reliable operation of that infrastructure. 
Increased temperatures can have adverse effects on electricity generation 
and transmission, and decrease generation ef? ciency in thermoelectric 
power plants.20 Higher temperatures increase power line resistance, 
thereby reducing ef? ciency, compounded by increased electricity demand 
during periods of excess heat, which only increases operational power line 
temperatures further.21 Increasing ambient temperatures are also causing 
15. Marco Braun & Elyse Fournier, “Cooling for Thermal and Nuclear Power Generation in a Warmer 
Climate” in Adaptation Case Studies in the Energy Sector: Overcoming Barriers to Adaptation (2016) 
at 77, online (pdf): <www.ouranos.ca/publication-scienti? que/ReportCaseStudies-EN.pdf> [perma.
cc/7JR4-4NWG] (report presented to Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Division, Natural 
Resources Canada) [Ouranos Report].
16. Ibid at Case Study 03.
17. Ibid at 34; see also ibid  at Case Study 08. 
18. Justin Gundlach & Romany Webb, “Climate Change Impacts on the Bulk Power System: 
Assessing Vulnerabilities and Planning for Resilience” (2018) Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, 
Columbia Law School at 10, online: Social Sciences Research Network <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3128971> [perma.cc/FG77-EFKK].
19. Ouranos Report, supra note 15 at 13. For example, the 2013 ? oods in southern Alberta 
completely destroyed an AltaLink substation.
20. Gundlach, supra note 18 at 7.
21. Ibid at 11.
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permafrost degradation in Canada’s Northern region. This has adverse 
effects on critical infrastructure as the structures rely on permafrost for 
stability, for example to support power lines, oil and gas pipelines or 
water lines, resulting in potential snagging of the infrastructure. Rising air 
temperatures are also contributing to increased forest ? re risk, particularly 
critical for Alberta’s oil sands industry which is surrounded by forests.22
Critical infrastructure assets such as pipelines and transmission lines, but 
also railway tracks, pass through forested areas and hydroelectric plants 
are often located in remote and forested areas.23 
Erratic weather severity and frequency will also have notable impacts 
on Canada’s critical energy infrastructure. High winds, anticipated to be of 
particular concern to the Western and Atlantic regions,24 have the potential 
to damage overhead power transmission lines. Heavy rainfall events can 
cause washouts of power line and pipeline infrastructure foundations and 
destroy ancillary infrastructure such as road and rail systems.25 
Another major effect of climate change is relative sea level change. 
Both the Atlantic and Paci? c regions are facing risks associated with sea 
level rise,26 which is often associated with coastal ? ooding and storm 
surges.27 For example, during Superstorm Sandy in New York State, 
critical infrastructure assets were destroyed and damaged.28 Sea level 
rise also increases the risk of coastal erosion, for example rendering 
port infrastructure ineffective. Canada’s largest port, the Port of Metro 
Vancouver, has been identi? ed as critically vulnerable to the effects of sea 
level rises.29 
II. The concept of “critical infrastructure”
As illustrated in Part I above, the anticipated effects of climate impacts on 
Canada’s energy infrastructure will vary widely and also have the potential 
22. For a general discussion of the emergency response to the Fort McMurray ? res see Stacey, supra
note 7. 
23. Gundlach, supra note 18 at 6, 12.
24. Natural Resources Canada, Climate Risks & Adaptation Practices—For the Canadian 
Transportation Sector 2016, by Kathy Palko & Donald Lemmen (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 
2017), online (pdf): <www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/? les/earthsciences/pdf/assess/2016/
ClimatRisk-E-ACCESSIBLE.pdf> [perma.cc/9WZZ-YSHM] at 68, 220.
25. Ibid at 68. (“Extreme precipitation events are a major concern in the Western region.”) 
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid at 9.
28. City of New York v BP PLC, 325 F Supp (3d) 466 (NY State Ct 2018) (leave to appeal to 2nd 
Cir granted) brief for appellant, online (pdf): <blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/
wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20181109_docket-18-2188_brief.pdf> [perma.cc/
BVX8-ZWDC]).
29. Adolf K Y Ng, Jason Monios & Huiying Zhang, “Climate Adaptation Management and 
Institutional Erosion: Insights From A Major Canadian Port” (2018) 62:4 J Envtl Plan & Mgmt 586.
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to overlap. For example, severe droughts may affect both the operative 
ef? ciency of an electricity power plant and also increase the risk of ? res. 
In addition, climate impacts on Canada’s energy infrastructure expose not 
only the owners and operators of the critical asset, but have the potential to 
impact and disrupt those depending on the critical asset, for example for the 
purposes of generating and transmitting electricity or transferring oil and 
gas by way of pipeline infrastructure. De? ning what constitutes “critical” 
infrastructure is therefore important for understanding the climate impacts 
examined in Part I. 
As a starting position, there is little consensus in the literature on 
how to identify and determine an infrastructure asset as “critical.” A good 
starting point, however, is Canada’s 2009 National Strategy for Critical 
Infrastructure,30 which uses the following broad de? nition:
Critical infrastructure refers to processes, systems, facilities, technologies, 
networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security 
or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of 
government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected 
and interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national 
borders. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic 
loss of life, adverse economic effects, and signi? cant harm to public 
con? dence. 
The strategy places the emphasis on economic and social interests, an 
approach that is also re? ected in the action plans to implement the National 
Strategy. The most recent plan, the National Cross Sector Forum 2018–
2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure,31 predominantly focuses on 
the convergence between the existing built infrastructure and the increased 
evolution of cyber security risks.32 The plan also identi? es Canada’s aging 
infrastructure as an “emerging risk” which has the potential to result in 
“increased risk of disruption”33 and “signi? cant impacts of infrastructure 
failure.”34 It is apparent that there is a strong public interest focus set out 
in the federal government’s National Strategy. 
In contrast to a broader economic and social approach to critical 
infrastructure, it may also be possible to identify infrastructure as 
30. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 3.
31. Public Safety Canada, National Cross Sector Forum, 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical 
Infrastructure (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2018) at 1, online (pdf): <publications.gc.ca/
collections/collection_2018/sp-ps/PS4-66-2018-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/TE7Z-GPEN] [2018-2020 
Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure].
32. Ibid at 5.
33. Ibid at 6.
34. Ibid.
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“critical” based on a “sector-speci? c” analysis. For example, the 
designation of an energy infrastructure asset as “critical” may be found 
in relevant legislation related to a speci? c sector strategic to the Canadian 
economy, such as the Emergency Management Act,35 the Energy Supplies 
Emergency Act36 and the Marine Transportation Security Regulations37 at 
the federal level. At a provincial level, the Alberta Electric Utilities Act38
sets out a list of infrastructure assets designated as “critical transmission 
infrastructure.” In addition, the provincial mechanism implementing the
Emergency Management Act framework in Alberta includes a list of critical 
infrastructure, which includes assets in the upstream petroleum sector.39 
An alternative to the prescriptive legislative approach is a risk-based 
approach. This process applies a “risk assessment” mechanism, drawing on 
a broader evaluation based on a number of pre-determined factors, which 
in turn rank infrastructure in order of critical importance. The advantages 
of this approach is that it is highly subjective, that it may be undertaken 
at different stages of the asset’s life-cycle assessment (for example during 
scheduled maintenance), and that it can be fully integrated in corporate 
management practices.40 For example, the Canadian Electricity Association 
has prepared a sophisticated risk assessment and management process 
for climate adaptation risks that anchors climate risks within business 
and strategic planning practices.41 Central to this mechanism is a clear 
prioritisation of risks and the continued monitoring and evaluating of the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts.42
For the purposes of our discussion, this article will proceed on the 
understanding of critical infrastructure as set out in the National Strategy 
for Critical Infrastructure. The strategy includes a broad de? nition of 
“critical” infrastructure, one which focuses on assets and systems that 
are essential to the functioning of the Canadian economy and society. 
35. Emergency Management Act, SC 2007, c 15, s 6 (requires federal Ministers to identify risks 
related to critical infrastructure within their areas of responsibility and to prepare emergency 
management plans in respect of those risks).
36. Energy Supplies Emergency Act, RSC 1985, c E-9, s 15 (gives the federal Cabinet the power to 
implement mandatory allocation of petroleum products in case of real or anticipated shortages).
37. Marine Transportation Security Regulations, SOR/2004-144, s 329(d) (refers to critical marine 
infrastructure).
38. Electric Utilities Act, RSA 2003, c E-5.1.
39. Security Management Regulation, Alta Reg 230/2012; Security Management for Critical 
Upstream Petroleum and Coal Mining Infrastructure, Alta Reg 91/2013.
40. Canadian Electricity Association, “Adapting to Climate Change: A Risk Management Guide 
for Utilities” (2017) at 13, online (pdf): <electricity.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Adapting_to_
Climate_Change-A_Risk_Management_Guide_for_Utilities.pdf > [perma.cc/XM5A-2TTB ] [Risk 
Management Guide].
41. Ibid at 14.
42. Ibid at 16-18.
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The strategy therefore applies an expanded understanding of the asset’s 
relevant context, which is discussed further in Part IV below.
III. Translating climate impacts into corporate risk 
On a narrow interpretation of critical energy infrastructure, climate 
impacts may appear to be localized and relatively containable, both from 
an environmental and economic perspective. This is not the case, however, 
in the highly networked and integrated energy infrastructure sector. In 
integrated business models, a localized climate event can result in broader 
service interruptions that may affect business operations beyond the 
affected location.43 A recent report prepared for the Canadian electricity 
generation and transmission sectors on climate change action identi? ed the 
sectors as priority areas for climate change adaptation, driven largely by 
an understanding of economic, management and operational risks44 to the 
supply and distribution of electricity.45 The vulnerability of a corporation 
“to climate impacts goes well beyond the physical exposure of its facilities. 
It includes supply chains, distribution networks, customers and markets.”46
For example, a shut-down of pipeline infrastructure in Canada as a result 
of a climate event causing the rupture of a pipeline asset would have the 
potential to result in signi? cant environmental and economic harm well 
beyond the physical location of the event. To this effect, Canada’s National 
Strategy for Critical Infrastructure con? rms that infrastructure owners and 
operators possess the key expertise and information on their assets and 
have primary responsibility “for protecting their assets and services.”47
The statement serves to establish a clear linkage between climate impacts 
on an asset and the myriad services related to it and dependent on it. 
Climate impacts on critical infrastructure raise serious challenges 
for a corporation and its of? cers. Failure to effectively manage assets has 
been identi? ed as a potential material risk in light of climate change.48 A 
climate impact may result in the full scope of social and environmental 
43. Daniel A Farber, “Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues” (2009) 1 San Diego 
J Climate & Energy L 259 at 267.
44. Laura Zizzo, Travis Allan & Joanna Kyriazis, “Understanding Canadian Electricity Generation 
and Transmission Sectors’ Action and Awareness on Climate Change and the Need to Adapt” 
(2014) at 10, online (pdf): <uwaterloo.ca/school-environment-enterprise-development/sites/
ca.school-environment-enterprise-development/? les/uploads/? les/understanding_canada_electricity_
generation.pdf> [perma.cc/24J6-LBFJ].
45. Risk Management Guide, supra note 40 at 5.
46. TCFD Guidance, supra note 15 at 15.
47. 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 31 at 1.
48. Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, “Extreme weather event attribution science and climate 
change litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?” (2018) 36:3 J Energy & Nat Resources L 265 
at 294.
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social costs, as well as corporate costs in the shape of loss or damage to 
the critical asset. Failure to adequately take climate adaptation risks into 
consideration at a corporate level, or to undertake appropriate adaptation 
to the infrastructure asset, could signi? cantly expose the corporation. One 
example of potential corporate liability could be grounded in a failure to 
adequately consider “foreseeable risk to the interests of the company.”49
In addition, “failure to adequately disclose climate related risks or the 
withholding of certain information from the market”50 may raise legal 
issues for corporate of? cers by way of corporate disclosure obligations 
and securities fraud. 
Corporations and their of? cers should also be mindful of the linkages 
between energy infrastructure assets and the wider climate change 
liability debate. To date, climate change litigation has mostly focused on 
arguments of climate change mitigation and tort liabilities arising from a 
failure to undertake adequate mitigation efforts, including: (a) the failure 
of corporations to adequately disclose knowledge of climate risks arising 
from the burning of fossil fuels; (b) the failure to divest of fossil fuel-based 
assets; and (c) questions of liability and attribution of corporate liability 
for the effects of global climate change.51 Liability arising from a failure 
to adequately adapt critical infrastructure assets against the actual and 
anticipated effects of climate change has not yet been the focus of targeted 
litigation against corporations. But as discussed below, this may change, 
and corporate of? cers should remain vigilant as to the disclosure of future 
climate adaptation risks resulting from actual or anticipated climate 
impacts to their critical infrastructure assets.
The potential climate impacts to critical energy infrastructure can 
be translated into corporate risk in three ways: (a) economic risks to 
the infrastructure asset; (b) management and operational risks to the 
corporation; and (c) risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations. 
Each are discussed below.
49. Ibid at 295, referring to the expert legal opinion on Australian corporate law by Noel Hutley 
SC & Sebastian Hartford-Davis, “Climate Change and Directors’ Duties” (7 October 2016), online: 
Minter Ellison Solicitors/Centre for Policy Development and the Future Business Council <cpd.
org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Legal-Opinion-on-Climate-Change-and-Directors-Duties.pdf> 
[perma.cc/DN4H-BH4R]. 
50. See the discussion on the New York Martin Act and ongoing litigation related to ExxonMobil 
regarding disclosure obligations of material information discussed in Marjanac, supra note 48 at 295-
296.
51. For a current overview of US and Non-US climate change litigation, see further the Climate 
Change Chart of databases maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law 
School and Arnold & Porter, online: <climatecasechart.com/about/> [perma.cc/DQ2M-BJC2]. 
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1. Economic risks
The actual and anticipated impacts of climate change on critical energy 
infrastructure include economic risks ranging from damage to the 
infrastructure itself as a result of a climate event, to loss of productivity 
and pro? tability, and to increases in risks related to the failure of the 
infrastructure resulting in potential environmental contamination and 
liabilities.52 The ability of critical infrastructure to adapt is directly 
in? uenced by the age, composition and design of the asset.53
Thus, with infrastructure ageing, climate vulnerabilities will 
correspondingly increase, requiring strategic investments in infrastructure 
that may not have been anticipated in the economic calculations for the 
life-cycle of the asset. Adaptation works should be prioritized and physical 
resilience incorporated into scheduled maintenance works, upgrades and 
retro? ts of critical assets. This will minimize the risk of potential economic 
impacts to the corporation resulting from damage to the asset or the need to 
remove the asset from service due to climate impacts “ahead of schedule.54
For example, it is estimated that $300 billion will be invested in Canada’s 
electricity infrastructure by 2030, a portion of which should be allocated 
to adaptation works.55
2. Corporate management and operational risks
Directors and of? cers must manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation. Their duties include an obligation to exercise a duty of care, 
to exercise sound business judgment, and to avoid con? icts of interest. 
Directors and of? cers also owe ? duciary duties to the corporation.56 In a 
2016 study, a lack of a clear understanding of climate change was identi? ed 
as a key reason for why the energy industry had not yet adequately invested 
in climate adaptation.57 A failure to anticipate and manage climate impacts 
to critical energy infrastructure could amount to a breach of the obligations 
owed by directors and of? cers to the corporation.
In addition, corporate management and operational oversight of 
critical energy infrastructure assets are subject to a detailed regulatory 
environment. The electricity sector serves as a good example of how climate 
adaptation may impose speci? c management and operational obligations 
52. Zizzo, supra note 44 at 10.
53. Jessica Boyle, Maxime Cunningham & Julie Dekens, “Climate Change Adaptation and Canadian 
Infrastructure—A review of the literature” (2013) at 15, online: International Institute of Sustainable 
Development <www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/adaptation_can_infrastructure.pdf> [perma.cc/X2SQ-RT7A].
54. Ibid at 11. 
55. Ibid at 12.
56. See e.g. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, Part X. 
57. Ouranos Report, supra note 15 at 110.
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upon the owners and operators of critical infrastructure. For example, the 
Electric Utilities Act of Alberta provides that an owner of a transmission 
facility must operate and maintain the facility “consistent with the safe, 
reliable and economic operation of the interconnected electric system.”58
Statutory provisions impose obligations of due diligence and reasonable 
care upon electricity utilities, obligations which will increase as climate 
events become more frequent and as the critical infrastructure ages.59 For 
example, failure to properly anticipate, prepare for or adapt to the effects 
of climate change has been the subject of a number of lawsuits in the 
United States against the federal government, including those following 
the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe.60 It can be anticipated that similar 
claims may be brought against the owners and operators of critical energy 
infrastructure, namely on grounds of a failure to adequately comply with 
the obligation to operate safe and reliable energy infrastructure. As Ruhl 
correctly notes, “the topic of climate change adaptation and the law is 
largely prospective…there is good reason to believe that the number 
of measures meeting the “but for” test for identifying climate change 
adaptation law will grow over time.”61 As such, a private law response 
based on grounds of a “failure to adequately adapt,” for example in the 
form of litigation against corporations for failing to undertake anticipatory 
adaptation works, should be anticipated. Corporations and their of? cers 
should therefore be mindful of the inevitable risks posed by their corporate 
decision making in relation to the operation of their critical energy 
infrastructure assets. 
3. Risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations 
Current discussions on corporate disclosure obligations in the climate 
change context are predominantly focused on holding corporations 
accountable for their (in)actions on climate change mitigation. This 
accountability forms the central focus of ongoing climate change litigation 
and corporate shareholder activism efforts related to the corporation’s 
failure to undertake adequate mitigation efforts.62 
58. Electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c E-5.1, s39(1). There is no caselaw or guidance on s 39 from the 
Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) charged with oversight of the statutory provision. 
59. Zizzo, supra note 44 at 12.
60. Ruhl, supra note 11: “Nothing could more pointedly suggest this is a potential issue for climate 
change adaptation law than the litigation against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers following the 
Hurricane Katrina levee failures” (ibid, at 26); See also Marjanac, supra note 48, “In the US, lawsuits 
have already been ? led seeking to hold governments responsible for damages resulting from failure to 
adapt crucial infrastructure to shifting ? ood risks” (ibid at 289).
61. Ruhl, supra note 11 at 20.
62. Marjanac, supra note 48 at 293, citing Sarah Barker, “Directors’ Duties in the Anthropocene: 
Liability for Corporate Harm Due to Inaction on Climate Change” (2013), online (pdf): Responsible 
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For example, as illustrated by a 2014 shareholder action to require 
ExxonMobil to report on its corporate climate change and carbon asset 
risks, investors are aggressively seeking disclosure of critical information 
on companies’ climate risks related to their assets for purposes of investment 
decisions and determining shareholder value.63 In the United Kingdom, 
two energy companies were the subject of a complaint to the Financial 
Reporting Council pursuant to disclosure obligations in the Companies 
Act 2006. The complaint by ClientEarth64 alleged that Cairn Energy and 
SOCO International failed to adequately disclose risks to the companies’ 
business operations and energy assets as a result of global climate mitigation 
efforts to transition to a lower carbon-intensive economy. Following the 
complaint, both companies made the disclosure voluntarily.65 However, 
the Financial Reporting Council has not yet released the results of the 
complaints or updated its guidance on climate risk reporting obligations.66
Increasingly, disclosure of climate adaptation risks, within broader 
corporate disclosure documentation, is gaining the requisite attention. 
In the adaptation context, disclosure is rightly considered “an important 
tool for investigating or assessing corporations’ adaptation measures.”67
Guidance on this may be found in the Canadian Securities Administrators 
(CSA) disclosure obligations on environmental matters. 
Disclosure requirements on environmental-related matters are set 
out in Environmental Reporting Guidance CSA 51-333.68 Relevant to a 
discussion of climate impacts on physical assets are the provisions on 
Investment Banking <responsible-investmentbanking.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Directors-
Duties-in-the-Anthropocene-December-2013.pdf > [perma.cc/4J2W-89YX].
63. Marjanac, supra note 48 at 295.
64. See ClientEarth, “ClientEarth complaint prompts transformed climate reporting from oil and gas 
companies” (27 April 2017), online: <www.clientearth.org/clientearth-complaint-prompts-transformed-
climate-reporting-oil-gas-? rms/> [perma.cc/4QFC-8QBN] [ClientEarth].
65. SOCO International plc, “Annual Report and Accounts 2016” (2016), online (pdf): SOCO 
International <www.socointernational.com/private/downloads/qOaacpfBIv-J5lMBnHdUUQ/SOCO_
ARA16_DL_.pdf> [perma.cc/N972-9UZZ]: “global transition to a lower carbon intensity economy 
in response to climate change could result in reduced demand and increased operating cost, capital 
cost, regulation and taxation. Accordingly, it is a factor that impacts many of the Group’s principal 
risks set out herein, including those associated with commodity price, reserves, operations, political, 
stakeholder and reputational” (ibid at 30).
66. ClientEarth, supra note 64: the ClientEarth report notes that “despite explicit reference by 
Cairn in its 2016 report to the FRC’s intervention, the regulator has yet to disclose the results of its 
investigation, or to provide guidance to companies clarifying that climate risk reporting is required under 
the law. ClientEarth has pressed the FRC to make its efforts more public…[the] two major companies 
have updated their disclosure practices as a direct result of ClientEarth’s complaint to the FRC.”
67. Hart, supra note 10 at 2. 
68. Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-333, Environmental Reporting Guidance, 
(27 October 2010), online (pdf): Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/
en/Securities-Category5/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-reporting.pdf> [perma.cc/4TCP-
MFEU].
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physical risks, for which “material disclosure” may have to be made. 
Material disclosure may include details on “environmental matters, such 
as the impacts of industrial contamination, changing weather patterns and 
water availability.”69
In March 2017, the CSA announced that it would undertake a project 
on “climate change-related risks and opportunities that impact an issuer and 
its business.”70 The CSA project focused on physical assets, the changing 
regulatory environment, and risks to existing business models in light of 
climate change in Canada.71 The project included a strong emphasis on 
adaptation as it excluded the effect an issuer has or may have on climate 
change mitigation, from its scope. The CSA project report identi? ed a 
number of encouraging ? ndings. Of the 78 issuers selected from the S&P/
TSX Composite Index for the report, 56 per cent reported that they made 
speci? c climate change-related disclosures.72 Those issuers not disclosing 
climate change-related risks identi? ed that they did not consider these risks 
to rise to the level of materiality or probability of anticipated magnitude of 
impacts.73 The report also noted that the oil and gas industry is “generally 
more likely to include climate change-related disclosure in their regulatory 
? lings compared to other industries, especially with respect to regulatory 
risks.”74 
One of the more challenging ? ndings of the CSA report is the 
observation that “substantially all users expressed general dissatisfaction 
with the current state of climate change-related disclosure.”75 One would 
have expected the CSA to clarify the regulatory disclosure requirements 
in the context of speci? c climate change risks to the business, but such an 
update is not presently anticipated. This leaves open the question of how 
accurate a disclosure of “material information” on environmental risks and 
management is, in the absence of more stringent reporting requirements 
on climate change risks. For example, it would seem unclear whether a 
disclosure pursuant to CSA 51-333 would require a corporation to report 
on the risk of a corporate asset becoming a “stranded asset” because of 
climate mitigation efforts (as reported voluntarily by Cairn Energy and 
69. Ibid at 9.
70. Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-354, Report on Climate change-related 
Disclosure Project (5 April 2018), online (pdf): Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/
documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20180405_climate-change-related-disclosure-project.pdf> 
[perma.cc/EFS8-H9WZ] [CSA Climate Risk Report]
71.  Ibid at 6.
72. Ibid at 12.
73. Ibid at 14.
74. Ibid at 15.
75. Ibid at 18.
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SOCO International in the United Kingdom). Without direction from the 
regulator, we do not know. 
It will be of interest to see if the CSA revisits climate change-related 
disclosure obligations in light of ongoing efforts at an international level 
to standardize assessment methods and disclosure obligations of climate-
related risks through the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosure.76 
IV. Climate impacts as direct and indirect risks to the corporation 
To date, the energy industry has predominantly considered the intersection 
of climate change, infrastructure assets, and corporate risk from the 
perspective of so-called “stranded assets.” Assets are “considered stranded 
when they were prudently acquired but have lost economic value as a 
direct result of an unforeseeable regulatory or legislative change speci? c 
to the industry in question.”77 As further developed below, the energy 
infrastructure asset would become obsolete or “stranded” within a carbon-
constrained economy that is focused on avoiding the worst impacts of 
climate change through concerted mitigation efforts.78 
For the purposes of our discussion, the argument may also be made 
that, based on increased risks of climate impacts as examined in Part I 
above, the critical energy infrastructure asset may become obsolete 
or “stranded” as a result of damage from a climate impact, rendering 
the asset inoperable or economically obsolete. This type of expanded 
“stranded asset” risk could be termed the adaptation risk inherent in a 
lack of progress on climate adaptation of the critical asset. This section 
will therefore brie? y draw upon existing examples of the risk of “stranded 
assets” in the climate mitigation context so as to develop the argument that 
a broader perception of corporate risk of stranded assets, in the adaptation 
context, is necessary. What unites the discussion on both “stranded asset” 
risks is that climate impacts on the critical energy infrastructure asset are 
essentially direct risks to the critical asset. This will be contrasted with 
a discussion below on indirect risks to the critical asset, where the asset 
is viewed through an expanded understanding of the asset’s context to 
76. Task Force on Climate-Related Disclose, “Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force 
on Climate-related Financial Disclosure” (June 2017), online: <www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/? nal-
recommendations-report/> [perma.cc/2LMV-ZLAQ].
77. Robert D Cairns, “Stranded Oil of Erewhon” (2018) 121 Energy Policy 248 at 249, citing 
Michael A Crew & Paul R Kleindorfer, “Stranded Assets in Network Industries in Transition” in 
Michael A Crew, ed, Regulation Under Increased Competition (Boston: Kluwer, 1999) at 64. 
78. For a helpful overview on the question of stranded assets and “unburnable carbon” investments 
in Canada, see Marc Lee & Ellis Brock, Canada’s Carbon Liabilities the Implications of Stranded 
Fossil Fuel Assets for Financial Markets and Pension Funds (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 2013) at 20. 
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include broader social and environmental systems that may be affected by 
the asset’s failure or damage beyond repair.
1. Climate impacts as a direct corporate risk
To date, from the perspective of corporations in the energy industry, the 
focus has been on the risk of “stranded assets” as a result of global climate 
mitigation efforts to transition to a low-carbon economy. This discussion 
views climate mitigation efforts as essentially hostile to existing business 
models and as posing a corporate risk. For example, as discussed further 
below, Chevron, Exxon and Shell have reported on “climate change 
risks” and the potential impact of climate change mitigation efforts on 
the corporation’s business case, including its assets. Similarly, both Cairn 
Energy and SOCO International voluntarily disclosed their corporate risk 
of “stranded assets” as a result of climate change mitigation efforts.79 This 
Part will build upon this discussion to broaden the concept of corporate 
risk in the context of a lack of climate adaptation. As developed below, 
the potential damage to critical energy infrastructure assets as a result of 
climate impacts requires an expanded risk awareness, one which places 
adaptation as the central objective in any corporate risk management 
response to climate change. Essentially, a broader concept of corporate 
risk is needed to include the risk of physical climate impacts.
To support the argument for a broader understanding of corporate 
risk, one which includes climate impacts, the theoretical approach of “risk 
management,” based on Miller’s integrated risk management framework, 
is examined.80 Here, the asset, and the management of climate impacts on 
the asset, are viewed from a narrow corporate risk perspective. The focus 
is on strategic management responses by the corporation alone. In contrast, 
by applying an expanded understanding of the asset’s relevant context, 
one where the critical infrastructure asset is viewed as one existing within 
a social and environmental geography, the effects of climate impacts 
translate into a broader corporate, and potentially public, risk. Responses 
79. ClientEarth, supra note 64. 
80. Kent D Miller, “A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business” 
(1992) 23:2 J Intl Bus Stud 311. See also Benno Rothstein et al, “Impacts of Climate Change on 
the Electricity Sector and Possible Adaptation Measures” in Ralf Antes & Bernd Hansjürgens, 
eds, Economics and Management of Climate Change Risks, Mitigation and Adaptation (New York: 
Springer, 2008) 231: “Climate change is becoming an increasingly relevant factor in the planning 
processes of electricity companies since it affects all areas of the electricity sector, from production 
via distribution to consumption. It is of paramount importance for electricity companies to de? ne 
adaptation measures in this new context so as to limit their risks and ? nancial losses” (ibid at 239). See 
also Ans Kolk, “Developments in Corporate Responses to Climate Change Within the Past Decade,” 
ibid at 221.
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to climate impacts in this broader context may therefore extend beyond 
those of the corporation. 
2. Integrated risk management and direct corporate risk 
Miller’s starting position is that the development of a strategy for the 
management of corporate risks is one of the primary objectives of any 
corporation.81 Historically, corporate risks were interpreted in isolation 
in the literature but any corporate perspective on risk should give 
“explicit consideration to numerous uncertainties.”82 On this basis, Miller 
developed an “integrated risk management framework” which provides a 
risk assessment framework for “identifying and assessing the many types 
of uncertainties relevant to strategy formulation.”83 There are three groups 
of risks faced by corporations which form part of Miller’s framework.84
Although reference is also made to social and natural uncertainties,85 the 
focus is inherently narrow and is limited to the interests of the corporation 
alone. This narrow focus can be seen by considering the current approach 
to “stranded assets” in the critical energy infrastructure context.
The Alberta Court of Appeal, albeit in the context of determining 
divestments of infrastructure assets for utility rate calculations, has 
interpreted a “stranded asset” as an asset that “has lost its usefulness 
before the end of its expected economic life. In other words, the asset has 
not yet been fully depreciated but is no longer capable of being used.”86
Although public utilities are not, strictly speaking, akin to corporate 
owners of infrastructure assets, two notable decisions of the Alberta 
Utilities Commission (AUC) may be of interest to our discussion of the 
theory of risk management in the climate change context. Interestingly, 
the AUC reached contrasting decisions on the issue of the recovery of 
undepreciated costs of damaged infrastructure assets as a result of climate 
impacts. In a decision arising from the 2011 wild? res in the Slave Lake 
region87 and their effects on electric distribution infrastructure, the AUC 
81. Miller, supra note 80 at 312. 
82. Ibid at 312. 
83. Ibid at 328.
84. Ibid, these are “environmental uncertainties” (factors that affect the business context across 
industries); “industry uncertainties” (related to market uncertainty, product uncertainty, and 
competitive uncertainty); and “? rm uncertainty” (? rm-speci? c factors).
85. Ibid at 314, “natural uncertainties” include variations in rainfall, hurricanes and other natural 
disasters. 
86. FortisAlberta Inc v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 295, at para 20. 
87. Re ATCO Electric Ltd: 2012 Distribution Deferral Accounts and Annual Filing for Adjustment 
Balances (29 October 2014), 2014-297, online: Alberta Utilities Commission <www.auc.ab.ca/
regulatory_documents/ProceedingDocuments/2014/2014-297_Errata.pdf> [perma.cc/8Y2K-3YL2].
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ruled that these costs could not be recovered.88 By contrast, costs arising 
from the impacts of the 2013 Southern Alberta ? ood89 on gas distribution 
infrastructure could be recovered.90 These divergent results have recently 
been revisited in academic commentary, which has criticized the AUC’s 
outcomes as arbitrary based on its reasoning that a utility “can recover 
stranded asset costs where the assets are stranded by a mechanism or event 
of a type and magnitude that the utility has experienced in the past.”91 It 
will interesting to observe if the AUC, albeit within the narrow ? eld of 
utility cost recovery, will change its stance on stranded assets in light of 
the increasing recognition and evidence of the now predictable nature of 
climate impacts in Canada.
Further, in the narrow context of managing corporate risks of 
stranded assets, it is noteworthy that in 2018, a number of international 
energy companies published reports addressing “climate change risks” to 
their operations as a result of global climate change mitigation efforts. 
The reports highlight the corporation’s response to climate change risks 
and efforts to maintain corporate “resilience.” For our discussion, these 
documents provide helpful insight into current corporate perceptions of 
global climate mitigation efforts as a corporate risk, and the assessment of 
the risk of stranded assets. 
Chevron’s “Climate Change Resilience” report discusses that 
“some assets may become “stranded” as unproduced reserves become 
uneconomical due to potential future regulations”92 arising from climate 
88. Ibid at para 66: “In the Commission’s view it is the characteristics of the event that are relevant 
to the determination of whether the event had been contemplated or anticipated by a prior depreciation 
study. If the characteristics of the Slave Lake ? res event are suf? ciently different to distinguish the Slave 
Lake ? res from the events considered in the previous depreciation study such that the characteristics 
of the Slave Lake ? res cannot be said to have been reasonably contemplated or anticipated in the 
determination of the depreciation parameters in that study, then the Commission would consider the 
event to give rise to an extraordinary retirement and the $400,000 notional net book value of the 
destroyed assets would be for the account of the shareholders.” 
89. Re ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd: Z Factor Application for Recovery of 2013 Southern Alberta 
Flood Costs (16 March 2016), 2738-D01-2016, online: Alberta Utilities Commission <www.auc.
ab.ca/regulatory_documents/ProceedingDocuments/2016/2738-D01-2016.pdf> [https://perma.cc/
YRC7-M9EU]. 
90. Ibid at para 93: “The characteristics of the 2013 ? ood event are of a similar nature to the 2005 
? ood event that was incorporated in the 2009 depreciation study. Relying on this ? nding of fact, 
the Commission concludes that the 2013 ? ood does not give rise to an extraordinary retirement of 
the destroyed assets and therefore the undepreciated net book value of $496,747 will continue to be 
recovered from ratepayers”.
91. Lou Cusano et at, “Prudence, Stranded Assets, And the Regulation Of Utilities: A Review of 
Alberta Utility Regulatory Principles in a Post-Stores Block Era” (2018) 56:2 Alta L Rev 403 at 433. 
92. Chevron Corporation, “Climate Change Resilience—A Framework for Decision Making” 
(2018) at 25, online (pdf): <www.chevron.com/-/media/shared-media/documents/climate-change-
resilience.pdf> [perma.cc/GR97-BKGD].
?????????????????????? ??????????????? ???
????????????????????????????????????????
change mitigation efforts. The report con? rms, however, that although 
there is the possibility that “not all oil and gas assets will get produced,”93
Chevron takes “carbon pricing into account where appropriate in our 
business planning to avoid having stranded assets.”94 Shell’s “Energy 
Transition Report” sees the risk of stranded assets in its current portfolio 
of assets as low,95 in part due to Shell’s strategy of producing 80 per cent of 
current proven oil and gas reserves by 2030. Shell’s active diversi? cation 
of its investments, including into electricity generation from renewable 
sources such as wind and solar contributes to a low-risk of stranded assets 
and “the risk of having assets that are uneconomic to operate, or oil and 
gas reserves that are uneconomic to produce because of changes in demand 
or CO2 regulations.”96 ExxonMobil’s “Energy & Carbon Summary: 
Positioning for a Lower-Carbon Energy Future” does not explicitly refer 
to stranded assets but notes that under oil and gas demand projections to 
2040, which include a 2-degree scenarios average, “it is possible that some 
higher-cost assets, which could be impacted by many factors including 
future climate-related policy, may not be developed.”97 
As set out above, these key energy corporations view climate risks as 
narrow risks which may affect business continuity as a result of climate 
mitigation efforts. The focus on climate risks is thus limited to stranded 
assets, in response to the risk of changing climate policy parameters, 
including the cost of carbon. No reference is made to risks arising to 
critical energy infrastructure from physical climate impacts on corporate 
assets. 
3.? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
In the 2017 Shell Annual Report,  in a section entitled “Our Strategy on 
Climate Change,” Shell refers to physical risk as a “potential impact on 
our facilities and ??????????????? in which we operate due to changing 
physical conditions.”98 This statement illustrates the fact that it is likely 
necessary to apply a broader understanding to the question of physical 
93. ????.
94. ????.
95. Shell plc, “Energy Transition Report” (April 2018) at 37, online (pdf): <https://www.shell.com/
energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/shell-energy-transition-report/_jcr_content/par/toptasks.st
ream/1524757699226/3f2ad7f01e2181c302cdc453c5642c77acb48ca3/web-shell-energy-transition-
report.pdf> [perma.cc/6GCX-3CSU].
96. ???? at 30.
97. ExxonMobil Corporation, “Energy & Carbon Summary: Positioning for a Lower-Carbon Energy 
Future” (February 2018) at 14, online (pdf): <corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/
energy-and-carbon-summary/Energy-and-carbon-summary.pdf> [perma.cc/XSZ7-S2TM].
98. Shell plc, “Annual Report and Form 20F 2017” (2017) at 65, online: <reports.shell.com/annual-
report/2017/?accept=1> [perma.cc/LTP2-PBA5] [emphasis added].  
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climate impacts on critical energy infrastructure, one which considers the 
critical energy infrastructure ?????? its broader geographical context. 
To develop such an expanded understanding of the asset’s context, 
this section builds upon Ottaviano’s broader discussion of the role of 
infrastructure in affecting economic geography99 and the risk regulation 
regime framework developed by Hood et al, which argues that context 
shapes the manner in which risk is regulated.100 An expanded understanding 
of the asset’s context as advocated in this paper necessarily focuses on 
the critical energy infrastructure asset ??????????????? with its geographical 
environment. Such a broader context allows for a discussion of corporate 
risk arising from climate impacts in a manner that goes beyond a strict 
economic interest in the corporate asset. For example, any climate impact 
on the asset is also an impact on its geographical environment, including 
its economic and social aspects. A good example to return to is Hurricane 
Harvey in Houston in 2017. The hurricane resulted not only in physical 
impacts on Houston’s critical energy infrastructure, but also caused, 
and continues to cause, widespread economic, social and environmental 
impacts beyond the assets involved. This example illustrates that the risks 
associated with climate impacts can extend beyond the corporation to the 
geographical system within which the asset is located.?
By examining the critical infrastructure asset within its broader 
geographical location and context, a different emphasis is placed 
on the role of the infrastructure asset. In contrast to the theory of risk 
management, this broader understanding of the critical infrastructure 
asset’s context does not view the asset as solely a private corporate asset. 
Instead, the asset is viewed as having a public dimension. This is because 
the public depends upon the existence of the critical infrastructure asset. 
As set out in Canada’s National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, critical 
energy infrastructure contributes to achieving a functioning society and 
economy.101 Moreover, the critical infrastructure asset may support the 
geographic location, for example by connecting it to critical energy 
supplies and resources and by way of economic contributions. In the event 
that the asset suffers a climate impact, the geographical context within 
99. Gianmarco Ottaviano, “Infrastructure and Economic Geography: An Overview of Theory and 
Evidence” (2008) 13:2 Eur Investment Bank Papers 8.
100. Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert Baldwin, ???? ??????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), discussed in detail in Quigley, ????? 
note 7 at 49.
101. ?????????????????????? ??????????????????????, ????? note 3, which de? nes critical infrastructure as 
the “processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, 
safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government” 
(?????at 2). 
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which it is located may suffer economically and socially. An analogy 
can be drawn with the historical coal mining towns of Alberta and their 
economic, social and environmental transition in light of Alberta’s phase-
out of coal production.102 The infrastructure asset is now defunct, and the 
geography within which the asset is located, correspondingly affected. 
On this reasoning, a restrictive economic risk management theory is 
replaced by a broader focus, one where private and public interests in the 
critical infrastructure asset are potentially aligned to address the direct 
and indirect effects of a climate impact. This approach recognizes that 
a climate impact on critical energy infrastructure is likely to affect the 
infrastructure’s economic, social, and environmental context. On such an 
expanded approach, the physical resilience of the critical infrastructure 
asset to climate impacts will include social and ecological resilience, 
which Adger terms “fair adaptation.”103
V. Expanding the concept of adaptation 
Although there is no universal de? nition of “climate adaptation,” Article 
7 of the Paris Agreement provides guidance by setting out a global goal 
of “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing 
vulnerability to climate change in the context of the temperature goal of the 
Agreement.”104 In addition, the de? nition of “critical infrastructure” from 
Canada’s National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure of 2009 examined 
above emphasizes that the objective of climate adaptation is to achieve 
resilience of the infrastructure in an economic and ecological context.105  
What do we mean by “resilience” and how does this objective manifest 
itself within climate adaptation? As a starting position, formulating a 
strategy for adaptation to climate impacts “requires a speci? c meaning 
to be given to resilience by de? ning the public interest.”106 For this, we 
can borrow the de? nition of “resilience” from the United States Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission as “[t]he ability to withstand and reduce 
102. Alberta, “Phasing out Coal Pollution,” online: <www.alberta.ca/climate-coal-electricity.aspx> 
[perma.cc/8QKZ-B3WG]. See also, Lauren Vriens, “The End of Coal: Alberta coal phase-out, 2015,” 
online (pdf): International Institute of Sustainable Development <www.iisd.org/sites/default/? les/
publications/alberta-coal-phase-out.pdf> [perma.cc/9QQC-2AKA].
103. W Neil Adger, “Emerging Dimensions of Fair Process For Adaptation Decision-Making” in 
Jean Palutikof et al, eds, Climate Adaptation Futures (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013). See also 
Nilufar Matin, John Forrester & Jonathan Ensor “What Is Equitable Resilience?” (2018) 109 World
Development 197.
104. Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into force 4 November 
2016), online: <unfccc.int/? les/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_
agreement.pdf> [perma.cc/N3EM-ZSTN]. 
105. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 3.  
106. Andrea Keessen et al, “The Concept of Resilience from a Normative Perspective: Examples 
from Dutch Adaptation Strategies” (2013) 18:2 Ecology & Soc’y 45, at 45.
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the magnitude and/or duration or disruptive events, which includes the 
capability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from such 
an event.”107
On such an understanding of resilience, physical resilience would be 
achieved by decreasing the vulnerability of the asset to climate impacts. The 
critical question, from the perspective of the corporation, is ?????????????
?????????? adaptation should achieve. For example, should adaptation aim 
to offer protection against the direct physical effects of climate impacts on 
the critical infrastructure asset only (i.e., limit adaptation to ?????? climate 
impacts on the asset)? Or, should the strategy focus on achieving a ??????? 
adaptation goal to achieve social and environmental resilience? From the 
perspective of the corporation, this is the core question for purposes of 
developing an appropriate adaptation strategy and assessing corporate risk. 
1.? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
As introduced in Part IV above, if the adaptation strategy adheres to a 
narrow theory of corporate risk management, the focus is limited to the 
interests of the corporation only. The corporation as owner and operator of 
the critical infrastructure asset will pursue a focused strategy of resilience 
to protect the asset against climate impacts. The scope of resilience is 
therefore narrow, with a strong emphasis on the private aspect of the asset. 
This translates into an adaptation strategy that is limited to the self-interest 
of the corporation in its protection of the corporate asset and reduction of 
corporate risk. Correspondingly, there is limited scope for public concerns 
to be re? ected in the adaptation strategy. 
When the objective of achieving resilience of critical infrastructure 
is broadened pursuant to an expanded understanding of the critical 
infrastructure asset’s context as developed in Part IV above, the focus of 
the adaptation strategy is correspondingly widened in scope. The overall 
resilience potential is increased. Any discussion of protection of the asset 
against climate impacts will now include the socio- and environmental 
aspects of the geographical context which supports the asset. The adaptive 
response is therefore localised in the geography; it is “context-speci? c, 
place-based, grounded in local structures and situations.”108 Important 
socio-environmental components that would otherwise be excluded are 
now included. 
107. Gundlach, ????? note 18 at 1.
108. Jana-Axinja Paschen & Ray Ison, “Narrative Research in Climate Change Adaptation—
Exploring a Complementary Paradigm for Research and Governance” (2014) 43:6 Research Pol’y 
1083 at 1085. 
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The distinction between the two approaches is critical to the overall 
risk of corporations arising from climate impacts to their critical energy 
infrastructure assets. The more expansive the adaptation focus, the greater 
the ?????? involvement in the adaptation discussion becomes. But how do 
we demarcate the geographical context that will be considered? Guidance 
may be found in the literature of adaptive management.
2.? ????????????????????????????????
Applying a broader concept of corporate risk, one where climate impacts 
on the critical infrastructure asset are viewed as an indirect corporate risk, 
necessarily invites a comparison with ecology and the adaptive management 
of ecosystems. As a starting position, there must be a recognition that the 
critical infrastructure asset is a component of a wider “social–ecological 
system…in which people depend on resources and services provided by 
ecosystems, and ecosystem dynamics are in? uenced, to varying degrees, 
by human activities.”109 
The ?????????????????????????????????? sets out a mechanism for an 
“ecosystem approach” which promotes the conservation and sustainable 
use of ecosystems.110 The ecosystem approach, in turn, is dependent 
on a system of “adaptive management” to “deal with the complex and 
dynamic nature of ecosystems and the absence of complete knowledge or 
understanding of their functioning.”111 Applying an adaptive management 
mechanism to the question of climate adaptation, it can be argued that 
the uncertainties of climate impacts on critical infrastructure should 
require a similar emphasis on ? exibility to respond to changing social 
and ecological conditions, as is set out in Principle 9 of the ecosystem 
approach.112 Furthermore, adaptive management includes a strong 
monitoring mechanism of both socio-economic and ecological factors. 
It is this emphasis on ? exibility, and on a mechanism to respond to 
changing ecological conditions through monitoring, which suggests that 
adaptive management could act as a model for future climate adaptation 
mechanisms. In his work, Olszynski has examined the practice of adaptive 
management in Alberta’s energy resources sector in relation to coal and 
109. F Stuart Chapin III et al, ??????????? ??? ?????????? ????????????? ????????????????? ????????
????????? ???????????????????????? ????, 1st ed (New York: Springer, 2009) at chapter 1.
110. ??????????????????????????????????, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993) [???].
111. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “The Ecosystem Approach” (2004) at 6, 
online (pdf): ???????????????????????????????????  <https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/ea-text-en.
pdf> [perma.cc/X3FT-EDKC].
112. ???, ??????note 110, Principle 9.
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oil sands mining projects, and in situ oil sands operations.113 These studies 
may assist in providing the rationale for, and delineating the scope of 
impacts to be included in climate adaptation efforts.114 
This discussion of adaptive management con? rms that a broader 
approach to climate adaptation will not only capture direct private 
corporate interests, but will also allow for indirect public interests (such 
as social and environmental considerations) to form part of any adaptation 
discussion. Essentially, the key question is how to demarcate the extent of 
the corporate risk arising from climate impacts to the critical infrastructure 
asset within its geographic location; it is a question of scale. The greater 
the scale of the geographic context, the broader the corporate risk will be.
A broader theoretical treatment of the infrastructure asset will also 
in? uence the questions of whether the asset is considered “critical” 
and, if so, critical to whom? This may expose the corporation to greater 
public scrutiny over the company’s infrastructure assets and adaptation 
responses. Such an enhanced public scrutiny has the potential to create a 
new corporate risk.  
VI. A new corporate risk 
To date, corporate risk arising from physical climate impacts to energy 
infrastructure has largely been limited to direct impacts to the critical 
asset, as seen when the theory of risk management is applied to the 
asset. But when the critical energy infrastructure asset is viewed within 
a broader social and environmental context, the risk of a climate impact 
may therefore not be limited to the corporation. Because of the public 
dimension involved, governments and public interest groups may want 
to expand their role in in? uencing how critical energy infrastructure is 
adapted. From the perspective of the corporation, this may manifest itself 
in a new corporate risk, one where the corporation will have to navigate 
climate adaptation objectives that pursue both private and public interests. 
1. Private and public adaptation objectives
Consider the new corporate risk in the following example. An inter-
provincial pipeline may not be a critical asset to the corporation owning 
the asset if it does not connect into a transmission network. In turn, a 
113. See Martin Olszynski, “Failed Experiments: An Empirical Assessment of Adaptive Management 
in Alberta’s Energy Resources Sector,” (2017) 50:3 UBC L Rev 657; see also Arlene Kwasniak, “Use 
and Abuse of Adaptive Management In Environmental Assessment Law And Practice: A Canadian 
Example and General Lessons,” (2010) 12:4 J Envtl Assessment Pol’y & Mgmt 425.
114. See e.g. ibid at 733-734 where the author discusses the proposed adaptive management 
mechanism for the Shell Canada Jackpine Oilsands mine, which included a broad scope of surface and 
groundwater management; climate change impacts; ? sh and ? sh habitat; socioeconomic and health 
issues; and reclamation obligations. 
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smaller energy infrastructure project may be critical to a remote local 
community if it is the only electricity transmission infrastructure that 
connects the community to a central electricity grid. Any discussion of 
“critical” must therefore distinguish between a classic “ownership” 
approach and a broader “social” approach. In addition, the question of 
“critical to whom?” may be in? uenced by the fact that segments of the 
infrastructure may be owned by different parties, especially when dealing 
with networked or linear infrastructure projects. The potential for both 
private and public adaptation objectives is apparent.  
Given these objectives, the allocation of responsibilities for 
undertaking climate adaptation to critical energy infrastructure will be 
challenging. From the perspective of the corporation, managing risks from 
climate impacts may not be a new challenge, but rather, “an extension of 
existing risk management.”115 This supports a strong corporate autonomy 
argument for any climate adaptation response. In principle, responsibility 
for managing climate risks should lie with the private owners and operators 
of the critical infrastructure asset, as the party “best placed to manage 
them.”116 Without adaptation, the energy industry runs a risk of signi? cant 
losses. As a result, the owners and operators of critical infrastructure assets 
have a vested interest to manage this risk and adaptation must be “initiated 
in advance, as a precautionary measure.”117 In the National Cross Sector 
Forum 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, the federal 
government allocated the responsibility to “collaboratively manage 
risks related to…critical infrastructure”118 to the owners and operators 
of critical assets. Responsibilities placed upon the private sector include 
identifying critical infrastructure assets,119 providing data and projections, 
and developing and promoting industry standards.120 
The private sector may, however, push back on assuming sole 
responsibility for undertaking climate adaptation measures. Owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure may invoke the “public good” 
nature of their assets to resist responsibility for undertaking adaptation. 
With respect to regulation, the energy industry may view any climate 
115. National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, “Roles and Responsibilities for Climate 
Change Adaptation in Australia” (2012) at 1, online: <www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/? les/18-
dccee-2012.pdf> [perma.cc/28GC-ZBTA]. 
116. Ibid at 3.
117. Tina Schneider, “Responsibility for private sector adaptation to climate change” (2014) 19:2 
Ecology 8.
118. 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 31 at Appendix A: Roles and 
Responsibilities.
119. Ibid.
120. Bednar, supra note 4 at 51-52.
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adaptation requirements with potential hostility, given that adaptation will 
mean expenditure on risk management that is still, largely, perceived as 
“indeterminate.”121 There are also strong market dynamics and competition 
aspects to adaptation.122 Competitive concerns may act as a disincentive to 
collaborate on adaptation or may be prohibited by competition law at the 
risk of market dominance or illegal collusion. 
The anticipated scale of climate impacts will mean that inevitably, 
corporate interests in the critical infrastructure asset will intersect with 
the public domain, especially on the key issues of responsibility for 
undertaking adaptation and who should pay for the adaptation. Critical 
questions related to the jurisdictional divide between the federal and 
provincial governments in Canada over climate adaptation are far from 
clear.123 They form part of the broader jurisdictional complexities related 
to energy and environmental matters.124 The question of jurisdiction 
over climate adaptation is therefore both a legal and political one, where 
demarcations between the federal and provincial governments remain 
unclear.125 Given these uncertainties, the federal government to date has 
not assumed a central role in leading adaptation policy in Canada.126 
In the 2016 Federal Adaptation Policy Framework, the federal 
government described its role as that of advisor only. It stated that its 
role is not to “prescribe how or when to adapt but to facilitate others’ 
actions.”127 On review, the Of? ce of the Auditor General of Canada 
(OAG) in 2017 concluded that the federal government’s action on climate 
adaptation was “insuf? cient.”128 The OAG found that Environment and 
121. Quigley, supra note 7 at 61.
122. Ibid at 57.
123. Canadian Climate Change Adaptation Platform, Infrastructure and Buildings Working Group, 
“Adaptation State of Play Report” (March 2017) at 48, online: Canadian Risks and Hazards 
Network <www.crhnet.ca/sites/default/? les/library/IBWG_SoP_Final.pdf> [perma.cc/836A-6MU7] 
[Adaptation State of Play Report].
124. In the context of developing oil and gas pipelines in Canada, see Nigel Bankes, “Pipelines and 
the Constitution: A Special Issue of the Review of Constitutional Studies” (2018) 23:1 Rev Const Stud 
1; George Hoberg, “Pipelines and the Politics of Structure: Constitutional Con? icts in the Canadian 
Oil Sector” (2018) 23:1 Rev Const Stud 53. 
125. Adaptation State of Play Report, supra note 123 at 49.
126. Bednar, supra note 4 at 46-49.
127. Canada, Environment Canada, Federal Adaptation Policy Framework (Ottawa: Environment 
Canada, 2016) at 1-2, online: <www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/migration/cc/content/2/
b/2/2b2a953e-756b-4e8c-a2ba-3fbdc3324dba/4214_federal-20adaptation-20policy-20framework_
en.pdf> [perma.cc/W2W3-PVL6].
128. Canada, Of? ce of the Auditor General of Canada, Reports of the Commissioner of the 
Environmental and Sustainable Development to the Parliament of Canada: Report 2—Adapting to 
the Impacts of Climate Change (Ottawa: Of? ce of the Auditor General of Canada, 2017) at 27, online: 
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/bvg-oag/FA1-26-2017-1-2-eng.pdf> [perma.
cc/Q77E-NAB5].
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Climate Change Canada had not integrated adaptation measures into its 
own policies and programs. Moreover, it had not provided satisfactory 
leadership or resources to other agencies on adaptation. This was the 
case despite the Department’s stated policy to facilitate adaptation and to 
provide leadership by example.129 
Although some provincial governments have attempted to ? ll the void 
left by the federal government’s inaction on climate change,130 a further 
OAG report in 2018 identi? ed the inadequate preparation by the provinces 
to the challenge of climate adaptation.131 To date, only Nova Scotia has 
assessed the potential impacts of climate change and has developed the 
requisite adaptation requirements.132 By contrast, several provinces have 
limited their engagement with climate adaptation to performing adaptation 
assessments on isolated sectors of their economy.133 Others have launched 
more general adaptation strategies, such as British Columbia’s 2010 
Climate Adaptation Strategy, where the focus is on building knowledge 
and implementing adaptation into general government planning.134 Given 
that the provinces are well-placed to undertake and to support corporations 
in their climate adaptation efforts, one would expect more guidance. 
For example, many provinces supply public utilities through Crown 
corporations, thereby holding valuable practical knowledge relevant to 
climate adaptation of critical energy infrastructure.135 
This lack of action on the part of both levels of government means 
that climate adaptation has not yet arrived at the forefront of governmental 
129. Ibid at 5.
130. Brendan Boyd, “Working Together on Climate Change: Policy Transfer and Convergence in 
Four Canadian Provinces” (2017) 47:4 Publius: J Federalism 546.
131. Canada, Of? ce of the Auditor General of Canada, Perspectives on Climate Change Action in 
Canada Collaborative Report from Auditors General: Perspectives on Climate Change Action in 
Canada (2018) at Exhibit 5, online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_otp_201803_e_42883.
html#> [perma.cc/MFW6-N5UU].
132. Ibid at Exhibit 6, which notes in the context of Nova Scotia that “the government had not 
reviewed the assessment since 2005 to see whether changes to risk ratings were needed, and not all 
departments were involved in the adaptation planning process.”
133. Ibid at Exhibit 6. For example, the British Columbia government assessed climate risks to the 
mining and agriculture sectors. As of 2019, the British Columbia Ministry of Transportation and 
Infrastructure requires new projects to consider future climate projections and to include adaptation 
mechanisms: British Columbia, Technical Circular T-04/19, “Resilient Infrastructure Engineering 
Design - Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate Change and Weather Extremes” (27 March 2019).
134. British Columbia, Ministry of Environment, Preparing for Climate Change: British Columbia’s 
Adaptation Strategy (February 2010), online (pdf): <www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/climate-
change/adaptation/adaptation_strategy.pdf> [perma.cc/AY3S-2GRP]. The strategy concentrates on 
observing and forecasting changes and supporting scienti? c research into ongoing effects of climate 
change.
135. Ouranos Report, supra note 15 at 85-86, discussing BC Hydro’s use of real-time thermal rating 
monitors on its transmission and distribution networks to monitor heat sag.
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awareness, making it dif? cult for corporations to anticipate possible 
regulatory responses. This uncertainty is yet another dimension of what 
this article has identi? ed as a new corporate risk. 
???????????
This article has outlined the implications of climate change impacts on 
critical energy infrastructure in Canada and has concluded that climate 
change poses signi? cant risks for the owners and operators of the critical 
infrastructure. As discussed, corporate risks in this context can take the 
form of either direct risks to the critical asset and to the corporation, or 
indirect risks when the critical asset is viewed within its broader economic, 
ecological and social geography. Once these indirect risks are included in 
a risk analysis, an expanded understanding of climate impacts follows, 
resulting in what this article has termed a new corporate risk. How can 
corporations navigate such an expanded category of corporate risk? 
In the ? rst instance, corporations must recognize that the direct and 
indirect impacts of climate change on their operations pose serious risks 
to business activities and business continuity. The pressing questions then 
become who should be responsible for leading, implementing and paying 
for climate adaptation? On a strict risk management approach, climate 
adaptation falls exclusively within the domain of the corporation as owner 
and operator of the infrastructure. The corporation alone should decide 
how best to achieve physical resilience of its assets and to undertake 
“responses to maintain business as usual.”136 However, as this article has 
argued, when the critical energy infrastructure asset is viewed within an 
expanded understanding of the asset’s relevant geographical context, 
i.e., within its broader economic, social, and environmental context, 
climate adaptation inevitably becomes both a private and public matter. 
Governmental presence will therefore likely occur, including in the form 
of regulation, and the question of climate adaptation may also become 
politicised. 
This potential for private and public interests in climate adaptation 
can be illustrated by the question of costs, which has been identi? ed as 
the most signi? cant barrier to adaptation.137 To date, corporations have 
136. European Commission, Climate Action, “Financial Institutions, Insurance and Private Sector” 
(accessed 15 August 2019), online: <ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/? nancing/others_en> 
[perma.cc/AG8T-KYVZ].
137. Julia Berry & Lisa Danielson, “Paying for Urban Infrastructure Adaptation in Canada: An 
Analysis of Existing and Potential Economic Instruments for Local Governments” (June 2015) at 
49, online: ??????????????????????? <summit.sfu.ca/item/17659> [perma.cc/V2S3-U3PH];?See also 
Martin Parry et al, “Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change: A review of the UNFCCC and 
other recent estimates” (2009), online (pdf): ???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
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typically restricted their perception of costs in the context of climate 
impacts to those related to damages arising from those impacts. They 
have not yet fully embraced the actual cost of undertaking climate 
adaptation.138 Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that their critical 
energy infrastructure assets provide a public good, corporations may be 
reluctant to internalize the full costs of adaptation. They may look to the 
public for a sharing of these costs, which will make the discussion on costs 
a political one. 
Another potential area for the corporation to navigate in regard to the 
new corporate risk set out in the article is the question of responsibility and 
leadership on climate adaptation. A factor contributing to the new corporate 
risk is the fact that currently there is fundamental uncertainty related to the 
allocation of responsibility on leadership and implementation of climate 
adaptation in Canada. Given the public dimension of climate adaptation, 
governmental leadership may in fact be necessary and welcomed from the 
point of view of corporation. Leadership in this area may not necessarily 
entail regulation, but could consist of strong policy direction. Either way, 
this would assist in providing some guidance and certainty to corporations 
in regard to the allocation of climate adaptation responsibilities.
As noted above, to date, neither the federal nor provincial governments 
have demonstrated leadership on climate adaptation in the context of 
critical energy infrastructure. In light of the national importance of this 
infrastructure to Canadian economic and social well-being, it would 
appear logical for the federal government to take the lead on adaptation. 
Given the urgency of climate change generally, and the need to adequately 
prepare Canada for the effects of climate change, it would be prudent for 
the federal government to assume an active role on climate adaptation. 
Clarity on climate adaptation leadership will be an important ? rst step to 
allow corporations to manage and navigate the new corporate risk. 
Ultimately, the key starting point for corporations is to view climate 
change and the potential for impacts to critical energy infrastructure as a 
new corporate risk as outlined in this article. To do so, corporations must 
view the infrastructure asset within its geography. Viewing the asset in 
this broader context widens the risk analysis and adaptation responses of 
the corporation. In this way, corporations can best plan for and manage 
anticipated and unanticipated climate impacts on their assets. 
?pubs.iied.org/pdfs/11501IIED.pdf? [perma.cc/9WNW-9PG6]. 
138. See generally Boyle, ????? note 53.
